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We study cyber conflict as a strictly competitive, two-person game in
discrete time, where each player discovers new exploits according to an in-
dependent random process. Upon discovery, the player must decide if and
when to exercise a munition based on that exploit. The payoff from using the
munition is a function of time that is (generally) increasing. These factors
create a basic tension: the longer a player waits to exercise a munition, the
greater his payoff because the munition is more mature, but also the greater
the chance that the opponent will also discover the exploit and nullify the
munition. Assuming perfect knowledge and under mild restrictions on the
time-dependent payoff function for a munition, we derive optimal exercise
strategies and quantify the value of engaging in cyber conflict. Our analysis
also leads to high level insights on cyber conflict strategy.
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1 Introduction
Conflict in Cyberspace, or cyber conflict, is important at both strategic
and tactical levels. In this paper we consider the strategic decisions made
by states or other groups about when and how to engage in cyber conflict.
The increasing dependency on interconnected networks both in military and
civilian life means that little is beyond the reach of cyberspace. Cyberspace
plays a central role in our social, economic, and civic welfare. It is, therefore,
not surprising that the United States “has identified cyber security as one of
the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a na-
tion” (United States Executive Office of the President 2010). Consequently,
security and defense in cyberspace has become an increasingly large part of
the defense budget (Stervstein 2011).
A defining characteristic of cyber conflict is the way in which weapons
in cyberspace are discovered, developed and employed. Players search for
mechanisms that can cause cyber systems to perform in ways not intended
in their original design, called exploits, and, once found, develop them into
one or more cyber munitions. These munitions can then be used as part
of a cyber attack. In searching for exploits to use against an adversary,
a player may also discover flaws in their own system and decide to fix or
patch them so an adversary cannot use them. Moreover, a player could
develop munitions based on an exploit that the adversary independently
fixes, thereby making the munitions obsolete. Thus, collections of cyber
munitions, or arsenals, are dynamic and their effectiveness depends on the
relative state of knowledge of the opponents.
In this context, apparently simple questions, such as “how long should
we hold a munition in development before using it in an attack?” and
“how should we allocate limited resources to offense versus defense?”require
novel analytical models. Moreover, the dynamic nature of cyber weapons
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development and obsolescence makes it difficult to assess the potency of
an arsenal; this is true for assessing our own arsenal as well as an arsenal
belonging to an adversary. Clear, useful analysis at the national level is im-
portant both for making sound future investment decisions and for creating
informed strategic and policy guidance.
To analyze the strategic decisions involved in cyber conflict, we present
a highly stylized model using a game theoretic framework—we view cyber
warfare as a game consisting of attacks that opposing players exercise at a
time of their choosing. Each player discovers, develops, and chooses to exer-
cise attacks to maximize the value of their cyber operations. Our analysis is
independent of specific technologies, and does not assume an explicit cyber
system or exploit.
More specifically, we model cyber warfare as a two-player Markov game
(Thie 1983, Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) where the choices available to each
player depend on the number of exploits known by each player and the
strength of each player’s munitions. In general, there may be multiple ex-
ploits that each player discovers, develops into munitions, and uses to attack,
but we choose to focus this analysis on a scenario where there is only a single
exploit to be discovered. At the beginning of this scenario, neither player
knows the exploit. Each player discovers the exploit probabilistically, and
upon discovery has a choice about whether to attack or wait. As soon as a
player chooses to attack, then the game terminates and payoffs are deter-
mined. In general, the mechanics we develop are strictly competitive in the
sense of Birmingham (1970). Our specific case studies are zero-sum. In all
cases that we consider here, the decisions are chosen simultaneously from
the action set of each player.
Using this highly stylized framework, we develop a preliminary theory of
cyber games and present a few representative cases only. Because the data
analysis required for this model to support real problem instances is highly
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dependent on the context and/or possibly sensitive, we present only generic
cases.
Under minimal assumptions, our analysis leads to a fundamental insight:
Success requires rapid action. Our model shows that delays in taking action
reduce the chance of a player’s success in cyber conflict. Such delays can
come from a variety of sources, including bureaucratic or command restric-
tions. A byproduct of our model is the calculation of how proficient a player
must be in other areas to make up for delays in taking action; in most cases
the required capability is unattainable. The immediate consequence of this
is that command structures in cyberspace should be agile with the correct
level of delegation of authority.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we review
previous work. In Section 3 we present our model and analysis. In Section 4
we present numerical examples. In Section 5 we present some extensions to
our model, and in Section 6 we conclude and discuss areas for future study.
2 Related work
The 2010 report, The Science of Cyber-Security JASON (2010), advocates a
multi-disciplinary approach to the study of cyber security, and it specifically
recommends borrowing ideas from other sciences, such as physics, cryptog-
raphy, and biological sciences, including epidemiology. The JASONS intro-
duce a two-player, stationary, discrete time model called the Forwarder’s
Dilemma as an example of what a game-theoretic analysis might look like.
This game considers whether an administrator should forward another sys-
tem’s messages on their network and is similar both in format and solution to
the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma found in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991),
which, along with Thie (1983) form the basis of the general analysis pre-
sented here. Lye and Wing (2005) and Shen et al. (2007b) also consider
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cyber attacks in the context of a game. A thorough survey of game theory
and cyberspace is by Roy et al. (2010), which develops a taxonomy of cyber
game theoretic models with two broad categories:
• Static vs. Dynamic. A ‘one shot’ cyber conflict game, where players
choose plans of action and then execute them simultaneously, is a
static game. A cyber conflict game with multiple stages and sequential
decisions is a dynamic game.
• Available Information. Players may have exact, imperfect or no knowl-
edge about their opponent’s intentions or capabilities. If the players
know the actions of other players once taken, the game is called a game
with perfect information. If the players know the structure of the game
and payoffs, but not the actions, this is called a game with complete
information. Finally, a game in which the payoffs evolve in time in a
random process is a stochastic game.
While game theory considers both cooperative and non-cooperative games,
work to date on cyber conflict deals only with non-cooperative games. In
the taxonomy of Roy et al. (2010), our proposed model is a non-cooperative,
dynamic, stochastic game with perfect information. There are several other
studies that consider game cyber conflict from a game theoretic point of
view, including Shen et al. (2007a), Otrok et al. (2008), Jolyon (2006), and
Liu et al. (2006).
The previous study which has the most in common with our approach
is that of Lye and Wing (2005), which considers a two-player, stochastic
game between an attacker and administrator. Their model considers cyber
conflict at the machine level; it focuses on an attacker attempting to find
the best policy among a portfolio of several attacks to damage a university
computer network. This game theoretic model of Lye and Wing maps to
the tactical level of conflict as opposed to our model that is focused at the
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strategic level between two players engaged in cyber conflict. Other work
has addressed aspects of our model. Cavusoglu et al. (2008) considers the
optimum time for a system administrator to release a patch. Kannan and
Telang (2005) considers the market value of new exploits, which is a factor
in our analysis. Our analysis is different because we consider the two players
as seeking to inflict the maximum damage on each other by use of a single
exploit. Nguyen et al. (2009) considers a cyber game between an attacker
and a defender with incomplete information; our work is different than prior
approaches because we consider two players who may either attack or defend.
The concept of an zero day attack is important in our development. Two
references which discuss these in detail are Bilge and Dumitras (2012) and
Patcha and Park (2007). An overall discussion of terminology and concepts
in the cyber domain may be found in Szor (2005). A detailed view of attacks,
by type is given in Hansman and Hunt (2005).
The goal of this paper is to provide a foundation from which to build
more complex models towards the ultimate goal of integrating the cyber
domain into the spectrum of conflict analysis, to support strategic models
for decision makers at the national level.
3 Analysis
Our analysis starts with two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
that the two opponents are operating computer systems that are sufficiently
similar such that the exploits are symmetric on each. In practice, we do
not expect that two real opponents would be operating identical systems,
however, modern software systems are often constructed from common com-
ponents (e.g., operating systems, open source servers, or standard communi-
cation protocols) that it is reasonable to assume that the same vulnersbilities
could be shared by both opponents.
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Our second simplifying assumption is that there is only one exploit to be
discovered, used, or patched. Extending our analysis to consider multiple
exploits simultaneously would require a significant expansion of the state-
space as well as additional decision variables and constraints, and we feel
that this extra machinery, although more realistic, would detract from some
of the basic insights we obtain regarding the timing of attack and patch
decisions. We defer such analysis to future work.
3.1 Model Foundation
As defined previously, a computer system may contain exploits; these are
unknown until discovered, after which they can be fixed in the form of a
patch or weaponized into a munition. We model the life-cycle of a single
cyber exploit as a four-stage process.
3.1.1 Discovery of the exploit
We model the discovery of a single exploit by each player as a random
process, occurring independently for each player, which may depend on
factors such as training, investment, experience and luck.
3.1.2 Development of munition
Once an exploit is discovered, a player can develop a munition based on the
exploit. We assume that there is a relationship between the length of time
that a player knows about an exploit and the effectiveness of the munition




Once a munition is developed, it can be employed at will against an adver-
sary in an attack.
3.1.4 Obsolescence
Consider a game between two players, Player 1 and Player 2. If Player 1
discovers an exploit in his system and patches it before Player 2 can develop
and employ a munition based on that exploit, then that munition becomes
obsolete. A patch can be thought of as an attack with value zero. While
not explicitly examined by the perfect information model presented in this
paper, when there is a lack of information, patches may play an important
role in the player’s strategy. For example, we may imagine a cyber conflict
with multiple attacks and limited resources where a player would only choose
to develop certain discovered exploits into munitions, while creating patches
for the remainder in his portfolio. In a game of perfect information, as the
one we consider in this paper, the ability to patch forces immediate action
on the part of the adversary. The ability to patch is what leads to analytic
results of Section 3.3.2.
Uncertainties about the obsolescence of a player’s own arsenal are a
key dimension in the analysis of cyber conflict. For the purposes of this
analysis, we assume that a player who is aware of an exploit also knows
whether the other player(s) are aware of the same exploit; this removes one
type of uncertainty. For a player who is unaware of an exploit, we assume
neither player knows how long it will be until the unaware player discovers
the exploit. This uncertainty in discovery times is the fundamental tension
that our model seeks to explore.
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3.2 Model Formulation
Our model focuses on a strategic cyber conflict between two players, where
there is a single exploit that is resident in the systems of each player at the
beginning of the game, to be discovered. Let i index the players i ∈ {1,2}.
The mathematical notation used to describe the game falls into three broad
categories: Discovery, Development, and Employment.
3.2.1 Discovery
Let T be the duration of time that an exploit has existed, which we also
call the clock time. Without loss of generality, we assume that the game
starts when the exploit is created. We create a discrete time model, with
T increasing over the set of positive integers. If the exploit was part of
the original system, then T is the age of the system. If the exploit was
introduced as part of a software upgrade, then T is the age of the upgrade.
Let di be player i’s discovery time—it is the moment in clock time that player
i discovers the exploit. We define τi = max(0, T − di) to be the relative time
that player i has known about the exploit; we call this player i’s holding
time. By definition, if player i is not aware of the exploit, then τi = 0. We
define a state of the cyber game, S, as:
S = ⟨T, τ1, τ2⟩,
where the elements of this three-tuple represent how long the exploit has
existed, how long Player 1 has known the exploit, and how long Player 2
has known the exploit, respectively.
3.2.2 Development
A player’s success in cyber conflict depends both on his ability to discover
exploits and his ability to develop effective munitions. We assume that at
any moment following the discovery time di, player i has the ability to create
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and deploy a perfectly effective patch. However, we assume that the act of
deploying the patch effectively announces it to the adversary; so patching
nullifies all munitions based on that exploit, and this ends the game for both
sides. Let pi (T ) denote the probability that player i discovers an exploit as
clock time progresses from period T to period T + 1. For convenience, let
qi (T ) = 1 − pi (T ). Let ai (τi) be the value of an attack by player i using
a munition developed using a holding time of τi. The value of an attack
is a function of τ instead of T because we assume that once the exploit is
known the effectiveness of the munition depends on holding time and not
clock time. We impose two constraints on ai (τi). First, we assume
ai (0) = 0,
namely that if an exploit is not known, then an attack based on it has no
value. Additionally, we assume
0 ≤ ai (τ) ≤ Bi,
where Bi is an arbitrary finite upper bound, thus disallowing cyber attacks
with either a negative value or an infinite value.
3.2.3 Employment
Once a player has a cyber munition, he may choose to use it. Let θi (T )
denote the action set of player i at time T . We define θi (T ) ⊆ {W,A} where
• W : Wait. While a player is waiting, he has either not yet discovered
the exploit (τi = 0) or he knows about the exploit (τi > 0) and may
be developing his munition.
• A: Attack. When a player attacks he receives the value of his attack
at that time. Attacking also broadcasts the attack’s underlying exploit
to all players.
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A player who does not know the exploit has a singleton action set, {W},
and a player that does know the exploit has the full action set, {W,A}.
3.3 Zero sum game with perfect information
To fully specify the game, we must define action sets for each player, and
the utilities for player’s actions. We assume a zero sum strategic conflict,
i.e., that any utility gain by one player results in an equal utility loss by
the opponent. We use the convention that Player 1 is a maximizing player
and Player 2 is a minimizing player. We assume that each player knows the
state of the Markov game, S. But this perfect information assumption does
not mean that a player knows the exploit. A player is still limited by his
action set. For example, if the state of the game is ⟨T,1,0⟩, it means that:
Player 1 knows the exploit, has a holding time of 1, and has an action set
of {W,A}; while, Player 2 does not know the exploit, has a holding time of
0, and therefore has an action set of solely {W}.
3.3.1 Markov game transitions
The discovery and development of attacks is modeled as transitions in the
state of the Markov game. The game begins in the state ⟨0,0,0⟩ and pro-
ceeds in discrete rounds. In each round, the clock time T increases deter-
ministically. Each player i has holding time τi = 0 until the player discovers
the exploit. Exploit discovery happens with probability pi (T ) for player i
in round T . Once an exploit is discovered by a player, the player’s holding
time increases deterministically. The resulting transitions of the Markov
game state are summarized in Table 1. A visual depiction of the states of
the game is presented in Figure 1.
Let V ⟨T, τ1, τ2⟩ define the value of the game in state ⟨T, τ1, τ2⟩; this value
represents the expected value to the players if they play the game starting
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τ1 = 0 τ1 > 0
τ2 = 0
⟨T,0,0⟩ (1−p1(t))(1−p2(t))ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ ⟨T + 1,0,0⟩ ⟨T, τ1,0⟩ 1−p2(t)ÐÐÐÐ→ ⟨T + 1, τ1 + 1,0⟩
p1(t)(1−p2(t))ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ ⟨T + 1,1,0⟩ p2(t)ÐÐ→ ⟨T + 1, τ1 + 1,1⟩
p2(t)(1−p1(t)ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ ⟨T + 1,0,1⟩
p1(t)p2(t)ÐÐÐÐÐ→ ⟨T + 1,1,1⟩
θ1 = {W} θ1 = {A,W}
θ2 = {W} θ2 = {W}
τ2 > 0
⟨T,0, τ2⟩ 1−p1(t)ÐÐÐÐ→ ⟨T + 1,0, τ2 + 1⟩ ⟨T, τ1, τ2⟩ w.p.1ÐÐÐ→ ⟨T + 1, τ1 + 1, τ2 + 1⟩
p1(t)ÐÐÐ→ ⟨T + 1, τ1 + 1,1⟩
θ1 = {W} θ1 = {A,W}
θ2 = {A,W} θ2 = {A,W}
Table 1: Markov game state transitions and action sets as a function of the⟨T, τ1, τ2⟩ state of the game. The game always starts in ⟨0,0,0⟩. As player i
discovers the exploit τi becomes greater than zero and i’s action set includes at-
tack. The payoffs of the players are described using two non-negative functions,
a1(τ1) and a2(τ2). The function ai(τi) describes the effectivness of a muntion de-
veloped by player i for τi time periods. We assume the game is zero sum, meaning
that the payoffs can be described with a single number as opposed to two numbers
– let a positive value be in faveor of player 1 and a negative value be in favor of
player 2. If player 1 (2) plays “A”, it contributes a1(τ1) (−a2(τ2)) to the payoff.
The payoffs are further described in Tables 2 and 3.
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Figure 1: Diagram of states in the Markov Game. The arrows in the diagram show
the possible transitions from one state to another, as described in Table 1. The
horizontal axis describes increases in holding time for Player 1, τ1,and the vertical
axis describes increases in holding time for Player 2, τ2.
at that state. Because the game is zero-sum, payoffs for both players can be
described by a single value. To analyze the game, we seek to characterize
this value function. In particular, V ⟨0,0,0⟩ is the value of engaging in cyber
conflict. We seek to characterize V ⟨T, τ1, τ2⟩ for every state of the Markov
game. We proceed in our analysis by considering three cases on τ1, τ2.
3.3.2 Both players know the exploit
The case where both players know the exploit is characterized by τ1 > 0, τ2 >
0; here, both players have full action sets, meaning each may attack or wait.
Table 2 represents the payoffs of the Markov game in such a state in matrix
form. Each entry in the matrix contains a single real number, since the
game is zero sum. If both players wait, the value is determined by future
play. If one player attacks and the other waits, the attacking player receives
the full value of his munition. If both players attack simultaneously, the
difference of the attack values gives the result of the game.
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Player 2 plays: W Player 2 plays: A
Player 1 plays: W V ⟨T + 1, τ1 + 1, τ2 + 1⟩ −a2(τ2)
Player 1 plays: A a1(τ1) a1(τ1) − a2(τ2)
Table 2: Payoff matrix for the Markov game when both players know the exploit.
The payoff associated with “Wait, Wait” depends on the future play evolution of
the game.
This leads to the following observation:
Theorem 1 For any game state ⟨T, τ1, τ2⟩ such that τ1 > 0 and τ2 > 0, “At-
tack, Attack” is an iterated elimination of dominated strategies equilibrium
with a value of a1(τ1) − a2(τ2).
Proof: Suppose V ⟨T + 1, τ1 + 1, τ2 + 1⟩ ≥ 0. Then V ⟨T + 1, τ1 + 1, τ2 +
1⟩ ≥ −a2(τ2) and a1(τ1) ≥ a1(τ1) − a2(τ2) and “Attack” is a dominating
strategy for Player 2. Given Player 2 plays “Attack”, Player 1 must also
play “Attack” and “Attack, Attack” is an iterated elimination of dominated
strategies equilibrium. A symmetric argument holds if V ⟨T +1, τ1+1, τ2+1⟩ ≤
0. ∎
Theorem 1 results in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 If the game starts in ⟨T, τ1, τ2⟩ with τ1 > 0 and τ2 > 0, the
game terminates immediately and
V ⟨T, τ1, τ2⟩ = a1(τ1) − a2(τ2).
Interpreting the results of Theorem 1 and the above corollary, a game
starting in ⟨T,0,0⟩ , T ≥ 0 ends optimally no later than one of the following
states is reached: ⟨T,1, τ2⟩ or ⟨T, τ1,1⟩. However, the game may also end
earlier, if a player who discovers the exploit chooses to attack before the
second player has discovered the exploit. Because for each i, ai (⋅) has a
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Player 2 Plays: Wait
Player 1 Plays: Wait Y
Player 1 Plays: Attack a1(τ)
Table 3: Payoffs for the case where player 1 knows the exploit and player 2 does
not. Because player 2 does not know that the exploit exists, he may only wait,
and the matrix reduces to a single column.
unique associated τi, for ease of exposition we drop the index i from future
uses of τ . For the remainder of this paper, statements like a2 (τ) should be
understood to mean a2 (τ2).
3.3.3 Only one player knows the exploit
For simplicity, we develop the theory from a state where Player 1 has the
exploit and Player 2 does not. The analysis follows identical lines in the
opposing situation. In this case, Player 1 has a full action set and Player 2
may only wait to discover the exploit,
θ1 = {A,W} , θ2 = {W} .
Suppose the state of the game is ⟨T, τ,0⟩. We define
Y = (1 − p2(T ))V ⟨T + 1, τ + 1,0⟩ + p2(T )V ⟨T + 1, τ + 1,1⟩,
to be the expected utility if both players choose to wait at time T . Table 3
displays the payoffs in matrix form.
Player 1 prefers to attack if Y ≤ a1 (τ). The fundamental analytic ques-
tion is ‘from which states does Player 1 prefer to attack?’ If Player 2 dis-
covers the exploit, the game transitions to the scenario described in section
3.3.2, and immediately concludes as specified in Theorem 1. We characterize
states ⟨T, τ,0⟩ from which Player 1 prefers to attack as follows. We define
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vτ (h)as the expected utility to Player 1 if he waits h time periods before
attacking, starting in state ⟨T, τ,0⟩. In particular, we have:
vτ(0) = a1(τ)
vτ(1) = q2(T ) ⋅ a1(τ + 1) + p2(T ) ⋅ (a1(τ + 1) − a2(1))
vτ(2) = q2(T + 1)q2(T ) ⋅ a1(τ + 2)+
p2(T + 1)q2(T ) ⋅ (a1(τ + 2) − a2(1))+
p2(T ) ⋅ (a1(τ + 1) − a2(1)),
leading to
vτ(h) = a1(τ + h) ⋅ h−1∏
k=0 q2(T + k) +
h−1∑
k=0(a1(τ + k) − a2(1)) ⋅ p2(T + k)
k−1∏
j=0 q2(T + j).
(1)
The definition of vτ (h) allows us to evaluate the states from which Player
1 prefers to attack. Player 1 prefers to attack rather than wait in state⟨T, τ,0⟩ if and only if the following holds:
a1 (τ) = vτ (0) ≥ vτ (h) for all h ≥ 1. (2)
This statement mirrors our intuition that a player should attack if only if
an immediate attack results in a higher utility than waiting for any number
of turns before attacking.
Theorem 2 If a1 (τ)is concave and nondecreasing, and p2 (T )is nonde-
creasing, then vτ (0) ≥ vτ (1) implies that Player 1 should attack in state⟨T, τ,0⟩ (i.e., Player 1 can never do better by waiting).
Proof: We proceed by showing that the theorem assumptions imply that
vτ(0) ≥ vτ(h) for all h ≥ 2.
Consider the quantity
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vτ(h + 1) − vτ(h) = a1(τ + h + 1) h∏
k=0 q2(T + k)−
a1(τ + h) h−1∏
k=0 q2(T + k) + (a1(τ + h + 1) − a2(1))p2(T + h)
h−1∏
j=0 q2(T + j)
= h−1∏
k=0 q2(T + k)[a1(τ + h + 1) − a1(τ + h) − a2(1)p2(T + h)] .
We know that vτ(0) ≥ vτ(1), which implies that
0 ≥ vτ(1) − vτ(0)= a1(τ + 1) − a1(τ) − p2(T )a2(1)≥ a1(τ + h + 1) − a1(τ + h) − p2(T )a2(1),
where the last inequality came from the fact that a1(⋅) is concave and non-
decreasing. Continuing with the last expression above, we have
0 ≥ a1(τ + h + 1) − a1(τ + h) − p2(T )a2(1)≥ a1(τ + h + 1) − a1(τ + h) − p2(T + h)a2(1),
where the last inequality came from the fact that p2(⋅)is nondecreasing and
a2(1)is nonnegative. Finally, multiplying both sides of the inequality by the
positive number ∏h−1k=0 q2(T + k), gives
0 ≥ h−1∏
k=0 q2(T + k)[a1(τ + h + 1) − a1(τ + h) − p2(T + h)a2(1)]= vτ(h + 1) − vτ(h) (3)
We can complete the proof as follows:
vτ(h) − vτ(0) = vτ(h) − vτ(h − 1)+
vτ(h − 1) − vτ(h − 2)+
vτ(h − 2) . . .
vτ(1) − vτ(0).
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Each of the paired terms on the right hand side is smaller than zero, by
Equation (2), thus we have
vτ(h) − vτ(0) ≤ 0,
completing the proof. ∎
For the remainder of this paper we assume stationary probabilities pi (T ) =
pi∀T . Theorem 2 shows that vτ (0) ≥ vτ (1) is sufficient to prefer Attack at
a holding time of τ while Equation (1) shows that vτ (0) ≥ vτ (1) is neces-
sary to prefer Attack at τ . Therefore, from state ⟨T,1,0⟩ player 1 waits for
k∗ = min
k
{vk (0) ≥ vk (1) } turns before attacking. Substituting the defini-
tion of vτ(⋅) we can write this as k∗ = min
k
{a1 (k + 1) − a1 (k) ≤ p2a2 (1)}.
The set in the definition of k∗ is never empty when a1(⋅) is bounded, con-
cave, and nondecreasing and p2a2(1) is not identically zero, meaning that
Player 1 will eventually prefer to attack. We conclude that
V ⟨T,1,0⟩ = v0 (k∗) (4)
While we presume that most cases will have nondecreasing a1, a2, p1, p2
functions, there is no reason that it must be so. Nondecreasing functions
model situations where the passage of time brings increased capability, both
in development and detection. However, there may be interesting, and op-
erationally relevant, cases where the functions are decreasing. Although we
do not present detailed results here, the value functions in these alternate
situations may evaluated directly by using Equations (1) and (2).
3.3.4 Neither player has the exploit
In this case, the game has been in play for an unknown amount of time and
τ1 = τ2 = 0; therefore both players have singleton action sets,
θ1 = {W}
θ2 = {W} .
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Using the theory previously developed, the value of the game given
Player 1 discovers the exploit first is: V ⟨T,1,0⟩. Similarly, if Player 2 dis-
covers the exploit first the value is:V ⟨T,0,1⟩. In the case where both players
simultaneously discover the exploit V ⟨T,1,1⟩ = a1 (1)−a2 (1). Because the
state ⟨T,0,0⟩transitions into previously analyzed states, we are only con-
cerned with the first transition. For stationary discovery probabilities the
next state transition probabilities out of S = ⟨T,0,0⟩ are:
Pr{next state is ⟨T,1,0⟩} = γ1,0 = p1(1 − p2)
p1(1 − p2) + p2(1 − p1) + p1p2
Pr{next state is ⟨T,0,1⟩} = γ0,1 = p2(1 − p1)
p1(1 − p2) + p2(1 − p1) + p1p2
Pr{next state is ⟨T,1,1⟩} = γ1,1 = p1p2
p1(1 − p2) + p2(1 − p1) + p1p2 ,
where we have introduced the γ notation for brevity. The value of the game
starting from ⟨T,0,0⟩ is
V ⟨T,0,0⟩ = γ1,0V ⟨T,1,0⟩ − γ0,1V ⟨T,0,1⟩ + γ1,1V ⟨T,1,1⟩= γ1,0v10(k1∗) − γ0,1v20(k2∗) + γ1,1 (a1 (1) − a2 (1)) , (5)
where the negative sign comes from the fact that Player 1 is a maximizing
player, and Player 2 is a minimizing player; and v10(⋅), k∗1 denote results of
Equations (3) and (4) if Player 1 is the first to discover the exploit while
v20(⋅), k∗2 denote the results of Equations (3) and (4) if Player 2 is the first
to discover the exploit.
4 Numerical analysis
In this section, we consider some concrete examples of the theory developed
in the previous section. Unless otherwise specified, we assume pi(T ) = pi,∀T
and pi /= 0. As a notational convenience we will denote the value of any
particular example as V n where n is the example number. The examples in
the following sections differ in the functional form we assume for the ai(⋅)
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functions. In each section, we give a possible interpretation on where that
particular functional form may arise.
4.1 Scenario 1: constant effectiveness functions
Suppose that Players 1 and 2 both have attack value functions such that:
ai(0) = 0
ai(τ) = ci ∀ τ ≥ 1.
The case of constant ai(⋅) functions represents the case where the maximum
value of the attack is realized in the first turn after the exploit is discovered.
This would represent cases where either the munition development team is
very quick in comparison to the other activities in the game, or the munition
had been previously developed and awaiting a suitable vulnerability to make
it viable.
Because ai(τ) is concave and nondecreasing for both players, we can use
Theorem 2 to compute the optimal attack time for each player, k∗i for i = 1,2,
which is 1 for both players. We may directly compute the value of the game
using Equation (5):
V 1 = p1(1 − p2)a1(1) − p2(1 − p1)a2(1) + p1p2(a1(1) − a2(1))
p1(1 − p2) + p2(1 − p1) + p1p2
In particular, Player 1 will have a positive expected payoff if and only if:
p1a1 (1) > p2a2 (1)
In this case, a player may make up for a deficiency in either discovery
or development by being strong in the other area. Because 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 these
tradeoffs are implicitly limited.
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4.2 Scenario 2: linearly increasing effectiveness
Suppose Players 1 and 2 have attack functions such that:
ai(0) = 0
a1(τ) = τ 1 ≤ τ ≤ 5
a1(τ) = 5 ∀τ ≥ 5
a2(τ2) = c ∀τ2 ≥ 1.
Linearly increasing ai(⋅) considers linear improvement in the value of the
attack function with time invested. This case generalizes the constant ai(⋅)
example in the previous section. While both examples demonstrate a maxi-
mum value of the attack–the maximum cap of 5 in the linear growth above–a
linear increase requires some time before the maximum can be achieved.
This function is also concave, increasing and we may use Theorem 2 to
determine the optimal attack time, k∗i , for both players. Specifically, k∗2 = 1
and k∗1 is dependent on the values of p2 and c as follows:
k∗1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if p2c ≥ 1
5 otherwise
As verification, we compute the values of vτ(h) for h = 1,2...5. We see in
Figure 2 that the maximizing value is h = 5. For example, if a2(1) = 1, p2 = .2
Knowing k∗ for both players, we may compute the value of the game,
V 2⟨T,0,0⟩ as a function of p1; see Figure 3.
4.3 Non-monotone effectiveness
Suppose that a2(1) = 1, p2 = .3, and Player 1’s value function has a single
dip, specifically a1(τ) = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 3, 6) as shown in Figure 4. Non-
monotone ai(⋅), is an operationally important case. The non-monotonicity
is caused not by “lost learning” on the attacker’s part, but rather captures
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Figure 2: Value of Scenario 2 from Player 1’s point of view. The vertical axis
plots the value, vτ(h), as a function of the number of time periods Player 1 waits
before attacking, h. The value function increases to the point h = 5, and decreases
afterward. By Theorem 2, this implies that Player 1’s optimal attack time, k∗1 , is
5.
the idea that there are times–due to political, military, or environmental
considerations–when an attack may have a payoff before and after some
specific event or circumstance, but not be as effective during the circum-
stance.
Because a1(τ) is not concave and increasing, we cannot apply to The-
orem 2. Here we need to actually compute the numeric values of vτ(h).
Performing this calculation, we see that k1
∗ = 5 and it is not advisable to
wait through the non-increasing region.
A decision maker may want to know what value of a1(7) would change
Player 1’s decision? We answer this question by performing a line search on
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Figure 3: Value of Scenario 2 as a function of Player 1’s probability of discovering
the Exploit, p1. Here we see that the value of the game is a concave function of
Player 1’s probability of detecting the exploit; increases in detection probability
at low detection values provide a bigger increase in the game value than increases
in detection probability at high detection values.
a1(7) and determine the threshold value is ≈ 6.6.
5 Extension: delayed action
It may be the case that a player discovers an exploit and cannot take action;
specifically, he is unable (or not allowed) to attack, patch, or work towards
development of a munition for some predetermined fixed time after discovery
of an exploit. This may be due to legal, policy, or organizational limitations.
Suppose Player 1 has a rule where he must wait w time periods after
discovery before any attack, patch or development of a munition. Consis-
tent with our previous definition of perfect information, if Player 2 has the
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Figure 4: The effectiveness function for Scenario 3. Unlike our previous examples,
the value of Player 1’s attack has a dip at τ1 = 6. In this scenario, Theorem 2 no
longer applies in finding the optimal attack time k∗1 .
exploit, he learns if Player 1 knows the exploit. Player 2 also knows the
existence and duration of Player 1’s delay rule. We wish to understand the
value of this delayed version of our game, which we denote as V w⟨⋅⟩. If both
players have the exploit, Player 2 can wait and exercise his munition the
turn before Player 1 is able to begin work; therefore,
V w ⟨T,1,1⟩ = −a2 (w − 1) .
If Player 2 has the exploit and Player 1 does not, Player 2 may continue de-
veloping his munition until Player 1 discovers the exploit, and an additional(w − 1) time periods before attacking; therefore,
V w ⟨T,0,1⟩ = − ∞∑
i=0p1(1 − p1)ia2 (i +w).
Finally, if Player 1 has the exploit and Player 2 does not, there are two
possibilities. First, Player 1 may retain sole knowledge of the exploit until
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Figure 5: Player 1’s value as a function of waiting time, h in Scenario 3. We see
that the payoff for waiting to h = 7 is less than executing at h = 5.
the end of the waiting period, or, second, Player 2 may discover the exploit
during Player 1’s forced delay time; therefore,
V w ⟨T,1,0⟩ = (1 − p2)wV ⟨T,1,0⟩ − w−1∑
i=1 p2 (1 − p2)a2 (w − i).
We may combine these expressions to write:
V w ⟨T,0,0⟩ = γ1,0 [(1 − p2)wV ⟨T,1,0⟩ − w−1∑
i=1 p2 (1 − p2)a2 (w − i)]− γ0,1 [ ∞∑
i=0p1(1 − p1)ia2 (i +w)] − γ1,1 a2 (w − 1) .
(6)
The implication of this is that unproductive waiting times are damaging to
a player’s prospects in cyber conflict.
Consider the specific example of two evenly matched players with bounded,
linear development functions, thus: p1 = p2 = .1, a1 (τ) = a2 (τ) = τ for 0 <
τ ≤ 10 and a1 (τ) = a2 (τ) = 10 for τ > 10. By symmetry, V ⟨T,0,0⟩ = 0
for this game when neither player is forced to wait. Now consider the case
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where Player 1 has a waiting time w. We plot the player 1’s expected payoff
as a function of w in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Player 1’s utility curve as a function of waiting time w against an
evenly matched opponent. We see that Player 1’s utility drops off rapidly from an
expected value of zero, with the implication that waiting is costly.
We can also ask ‘How good does Player 1’s detection probability p1need
to be in order to make up for a given waiting time w?’ Figure 7 shows
the adjustment required in this example; for waiting times longer than 5
periods, even perfect detection does not achieve parity.
The lesson of Figures 6 and 7 is that waiting times are costly and ad-
versely affect one’s prospects in cyber conflict.
6 Conclusion and future work
We have developed and exercised a limited, stylized model. Real situations,
of course, have many differences from the idealized mathematics; the utility
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Figure 7: Player 1’s required detection probability p1 required to achieve
V w ⟨0,0,0⟩ = 0 as a function of waiting time, w. Player 1’s required capability in-
creases rapidly and, because p1 may never be greater than 1, parity is unachievable
after w = 5
of this work is to define the cyber conflict problem with perfect information.
Additionally, we:
• Demonstrate a framework for analyzing the problem, which may be
extended to a wider class of military problems within and beyond
cyberspace, and
• Demonstrate that in cyber conflict, idle waiting times are damaging,
and we provide a means to calculate their disutility.
This paper considered (a) a symmetric problem involving (b) a single at-
tack that takes place in (c) discrete time and (d) with perfect information—
four idealizations that help us begin to tackle the problem of cyber conflict.
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Relaxing each of these assumptions provides avenues for additional research.
Of these, we believe that relaxing assumption (d) perfect information ap-
pears to be the richest area to explore in the future, and with this exploration
come considerations of credibility, reputations, and risk taking.
In this analysis, we have used “holding time” as a proxy for development
effort, the idea being that the longer a player holds the exploit, the more
effort that goes into developing the munition. In general, the development of
a munition will depend on many kinds of resources, including labor, compu-
tational resources, equipment, and time. If multiple, independent exploits
exist, then we would also want to include in our model the additional re-
source management decisions surrounding the simultaneous development of
multiple munitions (or patches). If multiple, synergistic exploits exist (i.e.,
the combined effect of using two exploits simultaneously is significantly dif-
ferent from the sum of the effects of the two exploits if employed singly),
then the model would need to account for this as well.
Extending the analysis here to consider the asymmetric (and admittedly
more realistic) case where opponents do not share the same vulnerabilities
will be an important topic of future work. In practice, we expect that real
opponents may share some, but not all vulnerabilities. In a perfect informa-
tion setting, extending the model we present to asymmetric vulnerabilities
involves expanding the state space of the Markov game. The expanded
state could include data on how many of the shared, own, or opponent’s
vulnerabilities are known. Further realism could be added by differentiating
individual vulnerabilities, at the cost of complicating the analysis.
Perhaps the most important avenue of future work is exploring imperfect
information settings. The Markov game framework we present provides a
strong basis for extensions into imperfect information. Specifically, imper-
fect information could be modeled as a belief probability distribution over
the state space of the Markov game. In other words, the players do not
28
know exactly which state of the Markov game they are in. Instead, each
player has their own probability distribution over the state space of the
game–based on the information the player has observed over the course of
the game. In each round, each player would make decisions based their own
belief distribution, and the results of both players’ decisions would impact
the belief distributions for the next round of play. Exploring simple versions
of the cyber conflict game under imperfect information would be the most
promising future avenue for yielding insights into the problem, though it is
clearly analytically difficult.
Other important next steps in game theoretic modeling of cyber conflict
will be to determine functional forms for the rate of detecting vulnerabilities
and the rate of developing exploits because these create the two fundamen-
tal tensions explored in this paper. In considering the rate and longevity
of vulnerabilities, we recommend following the approach taken in Bilge and
Dumitras (2012). For the development of munitions, we recommend consid-
ering software development generally; a good starting place is Nikula et al.
(2010).
Future work may also focus on finding, analyzing and using data to
populate the model we propose. The sources of such information might
be sensitive, or even classified; however, we note that absolute values the
parameters (e.g., the probability of detecting an exploit) are not required
in order for the model to be insightful. Rather, it might be sufficient to
analyze sensitivity to a range of values for the models to yield insight about
the competitive dynamics at work in cyber conflict.
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